in this article, we assess the development of labor market policy in three coordinated market economies (cmes), Germany, sweden, and south korea. While the varieties of capitalism (voc) dichotomy of liberal and coordinated market economies tends to underappreciate differences within cmes, 4 we emphasize the variation in the welfare/ production regimes within cmes. admittedly, all three cases have traditionally been characterized by high employment protection, but they present themselves very differently with regard to social welfare provision. Germany is the archetypical cme with a conservative corporatist (or bismarckian) welfare state, whereas sweden is the prime example of social democratic welfare capitalism. 5 although Japan is widely considered the prototype of the developmental state, 6 korea represents the archetypical developmental welfare state, where modest social policy "is intimately linked with and subordinated to the supreme goal of economic development." 7 recent labor market reforms in these three critical cases in the study of cmes call into question the orthodox claims of policy stability that dominate much of the institutionalist welfare state and political economy literature.
8 even though a large body of theoretical institutionalist literature that discusses institutional change and its sources in advanced political economies 9 has emerged, the predominant literature continues to downplay the scope of change that advanced welfare capitalism, especially in cmes, has experienced over the past twenty years. Most prominently, kathleen Thelen identifies distinct varieties of liberalization with which she supports the claim that different forms of welfare capitalism remain distinct.
10 looking at the case of sweden, Thelen acknowledges that comprehensive liberalization weakened coordination mechanisms, but insists that the swedish variant of liberalization did not compromise social solidarity. 11 by contrast, Germany saw a decline in social solidarity in the wake of dualization, but it did not significantly compromise coordination that is typically associated with social partnership. in fact, coordination between business and labor is seen as the driving force behind dualization.
challenging this perception of coordinated welfare capitalism, we argue that labor market reforms in sweden, entailing retrenchment, workfare measures, and labor market deregulation, involved an erosion of social solidarity. regarding the German case, we agree that social solidarity has been on the decline since the mid-1990s, but we also find that this transformation of the labor market is being driven by the collapse of the cross-class compromise of the postwar settlement. calling into question the mainstream east asian welfare state and political economy literature, we show a decline of the state in korea, where the government's steering capacity has been undermined by economic liberalization and democratization. This study of sweden, Germany, and korea shows that labor market reforms starting in the 1990s have successively undermined the defining feature of each of their respective worlds of coordinated welfare capitalism: social solidarity in sweden, corporatism in Germany, and the developmental state in korea. our research not only challenges the assumption of relative stability that is commonly associated with the study of cmes, but also contests the assertion that this stability is associated with the persistence of established political coalitions. We contend that across all three cases a collapse of established welfare state coalitions is the key political driver of labor market reform, with the withdrawal of employers' support from previous welfare settlements at the heart of this development. before presenting our investigation in greater detail, we examine the politics of labor market reform, which allows us to conceptualize our empirical findings and discuss the drivers of labor market reform in the three case studies in comparative perspective.
the politics of labor market reform
Much of the welfare state literature on the advanced political economies of the West has been dominated by the power resources approach (pra), which essentially argues that the generosity of welfare states and the decommodification of workers are associated with the strength of social democracy and organized labor. This approach assumes a basic antagonism between the welfare state and the market, as the costs of social policy undermine the profitability of businesses. employers are perceived to be opponents of the welfare state as it is an intervention into their autonomy, whereas social democratic parties, as the natural allies of organized labor, are thought to challenge employers' interests in capitalist societies. Therefore, the welfare state is depicted as a distributional struggle between labor and business in which left parties and trade unions are the driving forces behind the expansion of social policy and social citizenship. 12 The social democratic power resources literature greatly relies on the scandinavian experience and especially on the paradigmatic case of sweden.
in continental europe, christian democracy rather than social democracy was the key architect in welfare state building. 13 admittedly, the christian democratic welfare state, such as the German exemplar, is concerned with status preservation and risk pooling through bismarckian social insurances rather than through vertical redistribution, but this should not deflect from the principal pro-welfare stance of christian democrats. it is also worth noting that christian democracy has received considerable political support from workers, and the parties' labor wings had great political weight.
14 Thus, while social democracy might have been the preferred ally of trade unions, many workers and trade unionists found a political home in christian democratic parties with their distinct welfare state projects. and in fact, trade unions and skilled workers often preferred bismarckian earnings-related social protection over swedish-style egalitarianism, as the former was considered a better deal for industrial workers. 15 pra and the related parties-matter thesis (with the christian democratic modification) appear powerful for explaining the emergence of welfare states and their divergent development during the golden age of postwar prosperity, but accelerating globalization and deindustrialization raise the question as to whether partisan difference has been blurred in the face of socioeconomic pressures. While Walter korpi and Joakim Palme argue that partisan differences persist in the era of retrenchment and global market integration, 16 ramesh Mishra describes social democrats as "reluctant modernizers," who might not want to engage in welfare retrenchment but cannot escape structural pressures confronted with the "imperatives" of globalization.
17 from a rational-choice point of view, david rueda also questions the conventional wisdom that the interests of the working classes are well represented by social democrats and organized labor, assuming greater conflict between labor market insiders and outsiders after the end of the golden age. The former are not expected to show much interest in generous unemployment protection and active labor market policy. These policies not only primarily benefit labor market outsiders, but 12 esping-andersen 1990; korpi 1983. 13 van kersbergen 1995. 14 Manow and van kersbergen 2009. 15 also involve a heavier tax and/or social insurance contribution burden on insiders and greater wage competition and corresponding downward pressure on wages. instead, insiders favor strong employment protection, since it reduces their risk of becoming outsiders. When the interests of these two groups collide, the insider/outsider partisanship theorem expects social democrats and organized labor to prioritize the interests of insiders over those of outsiders, as insiders form the core constituency of social democratic parties and trade unions. outsiders, by contrast, engage less in the political process, as expressed in low electoral turnouts, and show lower levels of unionization.
18
Turning from political parties and organized labor to employers, the voc approach highlights possible business support for social policy expansion with the argument of a nexus between public welfare provision and skills formation. in particular, cmes relying on firm-and industryspecific skills (skills of low portability) face a critical challenge, because risk-averse employees (as well as employers) may shy away from making investments in these skills when the future environment is uncertain. but comprehensive employment protection and generous unemployment benefits are viewed as providing an institutional framework that encourages workers to invest in specific skills. While firm-specific skills are said to be best supported with high levels of employment protection (reducing the risk of unemployment, as in the korean case), generous earnings-related unemployment protection is most important for the formation of industry-specific skills as a means to protect skilled wages, as exemplified by the German case. although sweden, with its social democratic welfare state, is underexplored in the voc literature, it is seen as broadly corresponding with the German case.
19 against this background, social policy is argued as complementing the production regime in cmes. in fact, without sufficient social and employment protection in place, this literature anticipates market failure in the formation of specific skills. for this reason, employers in cmes with heavy reliance on industry-specific skills are expected to support social policies facilitating skills formation. accordingly, the voc literature makes the proposition of a "strong alliance between skilled workers and their employers in favor of social protection." 20 comparing pra and voc, the difference in coalition politics is straightforward. The former views the alliance of social democracy and the labor 18 rueda 2007. 19 estevez-abe, iversen, and soskice 2001; Mares 2003. 20 estevez-abe, iversen, and soskice 2001, 147. movement as being at the heart of generous welfare states, with employers opposing social policy expansion, whereas the latter considers cross-class coalitions, with employers supporting certain social policies, presuming these contribute to skills formation, as a central feature. like pra, voc has been criticized for its bias toward stability and for failing to account for paradigmatic institutional change. in this literature, the stability bias has its foundation in the concept of institutional complementarities, which captures the idea of linkages between subsystems of the economy, such as the welfare state and skills formation.
21 institutional complementarities provide strong incentives to stick with an existing institutional configuration, and political economies are expected to follow their paths. 22 Yet socioeconomic change, such as globalization, could be expected to alter the perceived benefits of particular institutional settings. for this reason, an actor that previously endorsed an institutional equilibrium might withdraw support in the face of dwindling benefits (or incurring costs). such actions might have far-reaching implications for the political foundations of institutional settings; old political coalitions might fall apart (destabilizing institutional reproduction), and new coalitions engaging in institutional redesign might arise.
although political parties and social partners have a prominent place in the analysis of Western political economies and welfare states, these actors are regarded as largely insignificant in the study of east asian welfare states. influenced by the developmental state thesis, with its focus on the steering role of the state in the economic development in east asia, the mainstream scholarship on east asian social policy-the developmental welfare state approach-explains the development of social policy in the region as a state-led process that is closely embedded in the project of economic development.
23 coinciding with the period of industrialization, the welfare state in the region was institutionalized during the authoritarian regimes in korea and Taiwan (1949-87) , and the soft-authoritarian regime in Japan , wherein the conservative liberal democratic Party dominated the political system. 24 bureaucrats were given substantial autonomy in policymaking, and as the regimes in east asia sought to legitimize their rule by delivering growth and employment, they pursued economic development first and foremost. in this context, it was understood that the welfare regime in the region was shaped by growth-oriented bureaucrats 21 hall and soskice 2001, 17. 22 hall and Thelen 2009; Palier and Thelen 2010. 23 Tang 2000; kwon 2005 . 24 Johnson 1987. who subordinated all aspects of state policy to the objective of economic growth through industrialization. limited social policy was promoted, not in terms of social citizenship, but to facilitate industrialization. as a matter of principle, bureaucrats wanted to minimize welfare expenditures.
25 rather than providing social welfare, the state preferred the role of regulator, imposing the costs of social welfare on nonstate actors, especially employers.
26
compared to all-powerful bureaucrats, business influence in policymaking in east asia was limited. certainly, employers enjoyed privileges as the state's ally in its bid for rapid industrialization, but in the end the state always had the upper hand in the so-called developmental alliance because it set directions and used incentives-or sometimes even disciplinary measures, such as tax probes-to ensure business compliance.
27 by contrast, labor unions had no meaningful influence over policy because governments suppressed them as potential opposition forces.
28 enterprise unionism was promoted, which prevented unions, especially those of large enterprises, from developing an interest in national-level agendas, such as social policy, and incentivized them to focus on particularistic interests including employment protection, wages, and enterprise welfare. 29 Political parties also played an insignificant role in social policy development. opposition parties were weak, while incumbent parties largely delegated policy issues to bureaucrats. Parties were seen as personalistic rather than as programmatic in Japan, and simply as nonprogrammatic in korea and Taiwan. 30 The observation that social policy was introduced and advanced under conservative authoritarian regimes with little involvement of political parties led to the conclusion that social policy development in east asia could not be explained by partisanship. 31 but the political landscape changed with the democratic transition and consolidation beginning in the late 1980s. While the democratization literature acknowledges the emergence of qualitatively different welfare politics and highlights the importance of electoral competition (though in somewhat vague terms), 32 little attention is paid to political parties in the democratic era. The literature also fails to pay sufficient 25 Goodman and Peng 1996. 32 haggard and kaufman 2008; Wong 2004. attention to trade unions and employers as actors in policy-making. Unable to move forward from the conventional view that trade unions in the region are preoccupied with particularistic interests, the role of organized labor in reform is at best understood to be secondary-merely following the lead of civic groups-and employers' associations are still seen as being in the shadow of bureaucrats.
in the sections below, we examine labor market reforms and the politics of them in sweden, Germany, and korea as critical cases in the comparative political economy and welfare state literature.
labor market reforms in sweden: the decline of social solidarity
The swedish welfare state presents the prime example of comprehensive decommodification, universalism, and vertical redistribution based on the idea of social citizenship. by international standards, social democratic welfare provision there is generous and credited with a long track record of low social inequality and low poverty. indeed, a high level of social solidarity is widely considered the defining feature of social democratic welfare capitalism. 33 in the domain of the labor market, the swedish model is characterized by generous unemployment benefits through voluntary, state-subsidized unemployment insurances combined with a long tradition of employment protection and active labor market policy (including extensive training programs).
34 although the literature acknowledges some change, the swedish welfare state is typically perceived in terms of great continuity, where social democratic ideas governing social policies persist during difficult times. 35 historically, the swedish welfare state is associated with the political power of the swedish social democratic Party (sap) in conjunction with a strong labor movement, as discussed above in the power resources approach. but the literature also highlights the role of employers in creating generous welfare states. While the mainstream voc literature focuses on social policies with a wage replacement function, such as unemployment benefits, and their contribution to industry-specific skills formation, Peter swenson, with reference to postwar sweden, shows that employer support can extend to active labor market policy. in the context of the labor shortages of the 1940s and 1950s, which increased competition between employers for skilled labor and thus put upward pressure on 33 esping-andersen 1990; baldwin 1990 . 34 sjöberg 2011 , 209f. 35 cox 2004 Thelen 2012. wages, initiatives for the expansion of employment promotion (investment in training and measures to increase geographical mobility) received strong support from business and paved the way for a broad cross-class coalition. 36 but the swedish postwar system of unemployment protection was under enormous stress during the global economic crisis of the early 1990s, which might be considered a critical juncture for the swedish model. 37 The country's gdp dropped by 5 percent and unemployment rose dramatically from 1.5 to almost 10 percent. Unsurprisingly, the crisis produced an enormous public deficit. The social democratic government was replaced by a center right coalition , which pursued an economic strategy of deregulation, structural reform, and austerity. as part of larger austerity efforts, the new government led by the Moderate Party reduced the generosity of unemployment benefits and terminated early retirement for labor market reasons. critically, the automatic adjustment of the benefit ceiling to changes in the manufacturing sector was abolished. With that change, the real value of unemployment benefits was significantly undermined over time and effectively turned into a flat-rate system for the majority of benefit recipients. 38 according to the comparative Welfare entitlement dataset, the wage replacement rate for the average production worker with family dropped sharply from 89.2 percent in 1991 to 64.4 percent in 2011 (from 87.5 to 60.3 percent for a single person), and sweden thus lost its status of exceptional benefit generosity.
39 in addition to retrenchment in unemployment protection, the country also deregulated employment protection for temporary workers on several different occasions (from 4.08 in the early 1990s to 0.81 in 2008, according to the oecd employment Protection index, which pushed sweden below the oecd average of 1.75). by contrast, regular employees experienced insignificant labor market deregulation. 40 We find that starting with the economic crisis in the early 1990s, swedish labor market policy experienced a gradual transformation that changed the scope of social protection for the unemployed and employment protection. labor market reforms driven by the center right government appear to provide support for the power resources model, as a coalition of the political right implemented retrenchment 36 and workfare measures. but it is critical to note that the social democratic opposition by and large also supported retrenchment and workfare in the face of the global economic and associated fiscal crisis. 41 from this point of view, swedish social democrats might be described as reluctant reformers who might not have a genuine preference for retrenchment (unlike parties of the political right), but who surrendered to perceived imperatives. 42 Magnus ryner highlights the importance of globalization on the perceived feasibility of the swedish model of welfare capitalism.
43 duane swank and Virpi Timonen elaborate, with specific reference to the economic crisis of the early 1990s, that the conjuncture of globalization, most notably international capital mobility and also the increasing multinationalization of swedish companies, and the fiscal crisis put downward pressure on the welfare state by undermining macroeconomic policy autonomy. 44 With a similar impetus, Michael klitgaard and Johannes lindvall underline the importance of economic constraints and fiscal pressure for the market-oriented reforms of social democracy. 45 crucially, in light of the economic crisis the sap moved ideologically toward the political center and gave up its objective of full employment-a cornerstone in traditional social democratic economic and social policy. 46 To explain the neoliberalization of swedish social democracy, ryner draws attention to the importance of employers adopting a Thatcherite political orientation and their mobilization for neoliberal reform, which had immense influence on social democratic senior economic policymakers and their perception of feasible economic and social policies. 47 Thus, accepting the imperatives of globalization, social democrats effectively accepted a shift in power toward business with its option of moving production and employment abroad.
employers, as documents reveal, took an increasingly outspoken approach against social welfare and employment protection. specifically, they pressed for the deregulation of the labor market to make it easier to hire and fire staff. comparing sweden to denmark, employers noted that the danish economy benefited from outsourcing, which was argued to be associated with the great flexibility of its labor market, while the swedish economy did not. in addition to this policy lesson from denmark, employers looked to the continent and identified the netherlands as a "european leader in the labor market field." 49 in addition to labor market deregulation, the netherlands was praised for restructuring its unemployment protection (including reduced unemployment benefits and stricter eligibility criteria), lowering marginal taxes on labor income, and decreasing payroll taxes. swedish employers viewed the benefit and tax system critically: "The high marginal taxes, complemented with generous transfer systems, are to blame for diminishing the incentive to work." 50 They called for increasing the gap between labor incomes and transfer incomes by reducing marginal tax rates to be funded through "larger restraints on public spending on services-first of all on transfer payments." 51 as for labor costs, employers pushed for reductions to maintain the competitiveness of investments and production in sweden, and employers' contributions to social protection were viewed particularly critical. contextualizing labor market and social policy preferences, employers highlighted the country's changing place in the world economy and explicitly identified globalization as the "most important change" for swedish businesses because it "leads to the strategic decisions on the future of a company to an ever greater extent being taken against the backdrop of a global perspective." 52 although it was acknowledged that sweden had been long dependent on international trade for prosperity, employers argued that after 1990, the globalization of the swedish economy had seen a "giant leap," and as an important consequence "the relevance of the old swedish model of negotiation . . . is diminishing."
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With this sharp change in preferences, employers departed from the previous politics of compromise that had long characterized the swedish model and took an "aggressive neoliberal posture," 54 which challenges the idea of the persistence of cross-class alliance in cmes in the face of globalization. The voc proposition that "firms and workers have common interests to defend because they have invested in many cospecific assets, such as industry-specific skills" 55 a sound empirical foundation in recent swedish labor market policy. in pursuit of their interests, employers funded university departments to promote the teaching of neoclassical economics and professionalized their media outreach to promote changes in public attitudes. They also undertook more direct intervention into the political process by funding conservative politicians, such as the Moderate Party's carl bildt, who became prime minister of the center right coalition in the early 1990s. 56 employers' new "politics of confrontation" 57 and dissatisfaction with the status quo manifested themselves most strongly in 1991 when, with great symbolic power, business removed its representatives from the boards of most government agencies, including the labor Market board, which had responsibility for active labor market policy. 58 Thus, we observe not only stronger linkages between employers and the political right, but also a deliberate business strategy of abandoning corporatist institutions that previously had served as important means of interest mediation. Politically, employers' withdrawal from the postwar welfare settlement left social democracy and organized labor increasingly vulnerable. There is "no doubt that the desire to weaken lo's [swedish Trade Union confederation] political clout was a prime motivation for saf's [swedish employers association] broader push to weaken swedish tripartism in general." 59 similarly, sven steinmo concludes that employers "came to believe that the lo and social democrats could no longer be trusted." 60 employers' increasingly critical stance toward organized labor was broadly shared by the Moderate Party, which displayed some significant hostility toward unions (especially in its attempts to nationalize union-run unemployment insurance funds). 61 Thus, unlike its German counterparts, the swedish labor movement had no significant links to the center right, which seriously undermined unions' political capacity when social democracy was not in power.
after returning to government in the second half of the 1990s, the sap continued on the path of welfare state restructuring despite strong resistance from organized labor, indicating a rift between the two sides. as for unemployment protection, the social democrats further reduced benefit generosity and tightened the sanction regime to cope with the financial pressures they faced. retrenchment by the center right in government and it continued on this trajectory when it returned to power, and the social democrats, against strong opposition from unions, pushed for labor market deregulation. in fact, it has been argued that the sum total of retrenchment by the sap exceeded the cuts made by the center right coalition. 63 The social democratic government also looked into other options for reducing costs, including the abolition of the requalification condition, which since the 1980s had allowed the building up of new unemployment benefit entitlements through participation in labor market programs. but this proposal met with rather strong union opposition and was eventually dropped. When relations with the unions further deteriorated, the government raised the unemployment benefit replacement rate (financed by cuts elsewhere), which could be viewed as a measure to appease organized labor. 64 This episode is important because it shows that unions were still in a position to exercise some, though increasingly limited, influence on the sap, even though the party had successively departed from traditionalist labor market and social policy. in this context, it is also critical to note that despite increasing ideological distance and conflicts between the sap and organized labor (especially the lo), institutional linkages between the two sides persisted and the party continued to rely on unions' financial support and their mobilization of union members in general elections. 65 Thus, social democrats found themselves in the difficult position of balancing the perceived necessity of programmatic modernization and maintaining reasonably good relations with their long-standing allies.
at the beginning of the millennium, in addition to raising the ceiling for unemployment benefits, the sap introduced further changes in labor market policy wherein activation of the unemployed was addressed more explicitly. The government eventually removed the requalification condition and replaced it with the "activity guarantee," a new program for the long-term unemployed combined with a tightening of job-search criteria and the benefit sanction regime. 66 While trade unions broadly supported these changes (though unsuccessfully demanding more generous benefits), employers showed much skepticism. The latter called for even tougher job-search criteria and thought raising the benefit ceiling was the wrong signal to give to the unemployed; employers argued it would result in longer unemployment. business also remained 63 2011, 213. unconvinced of the benefits of the activity guarantee and called instead for a reduced tax burden to promote job growth. 67 While the activity guarantee might suggest some renewed labor market policy activism on behalf of the social democratic government, it is important to note that active labor market policy has become less prominent in the swedish policy mix and spending has been in sharp decline since the 1990s. at 2.8 percent of gdp in the first half of the 1990s, spending on active labor market policy peaked, but it dropped to 1.0 percent in 2009 despite an unemployment rate of more than 8 percent, which is comparable to unemployment levels in the late 1990s, when sweden spent more than 2 percent of gdp on active labor market policy. looking at training measures-the core of social democratic activation-we observe a collapse in spending with a fall from 1.0 percent of gdp in the early 1990s to 0.1 percent of gdp in 2009; at this level, sweden became a low spender in its efforts to improve the employability of jobseekers.
68 Unsurprisingly in light of these figures, it has been argued that swedish policymakers (including social democrats) lost faith in traditional active labor market policy, which of course has huge implications for the previous focus on human capital investments 69 and suggests the erosion of a key pillar of the swedish model across the political spectrum.
The reforms did not translate into greater electoral support for the government. in the 2006 election, a coalition led by the Moderate Party defeated the social democratic government. The new government continued on the path of restructuring unemployment protection and in fact accelerated the process. 70 in a highly symbolic move with significant implications for social solidarity, the government increased the financing fees for insurance funds, which translated into considerably higher membership fees and a sharp decline in membership, especially among low-income workers.
71 after the failure to nationalize union-run unemployment insurance funds in the early 1990s, the move can be interpreted as another attempt by the moderates to weaken organized labor. although there is some evidence that the differences between the left and right have diminished since the 1990s, we find that the Moderate Party campaigned aggressively on the issue of employment and did not disguise its policy program of cutting unemployment benefits to boost job growth.
72 among the different social policy programs, retrenchment of unemployment protection could be considered an electorally 67 74 lindvall and rueda argue that social democrats lost the confidence of labor market insiders in the face of Moderate Party campaigning for unemployment benefit cuts and presenting itself as the new labor party-corresponding with the argument that insiders have no strong interest in generous unemployment protection. 75 Thus, stefan svallfors may conclude that the social democratic welfare state is thriving and more popular than ever in sweden. Yet changes in the support for unemployment protection must be noted. admittedly, employment policy experienced an increase in public support in the 2000s, but this movement should not deflect from the considerable erosion in public support in the preceding twenty years.
76 it appears that this secular decline of social solidarity among voters enabled the Moderate Party to pursue a strategy of selective welfare state retrenchment, and the confirmation of its government in the 2010 election indicates the political viability of the strategy.
The developments in labor market policy from the early 1990s suggest a considerable decline in social solidarity in sweden as far as the unemployed and labor market outsiders are concerned. Unemployment protection has seen a reduction of benefit generosity in addition to a strengthening of workfare. at the same time, human capital investment has lost its importance in the swedish policy mix. With comprehensive labor market deregulation, temporary workers have also experienced greater exposure to the market. recommodification has gained much more prominence in swedish labor market policy. The argument of unchallenged social solidarity in sweden is further undermined by a considerable increase in poverty. from the mid-1990s to 2011, the poverty rate in sweden after taxes and transfers (60 percent poverty line) more than doubled to 17.4 percent. With it, sweden reached Uk poverty levels (17.0 percent) and exceeded poverty in Germany (15.0 percent). admittedly, sweden, with a Gini coefficient (post taxes and transfers) of 0.273 in 2011, still displays less income inequality than the Uk (0.344) and Germany (0.293). but since the early 1990s, income inequality has seen a marked increase (0.209 in 1991) country had lost its status of exceptionally low income inequality (in comparison, belgium's rate was 0.264 and denmark's was 0.253).
77 although the most comprehensive labor market restructuring was pushed by the political right, the social democrats also engaged in retrenchment, workfare policies, and labor market deregulation. for this reason, even though some programmatic differences between the main political parties remain (for instance, in conflicts over replacement rates), it is suggested that sweden has experienced a decline in the importance of partisanship in labor market policy, 78 and that presents a significant challenge to the power resources model. Paradoxically, intense political conflict between the two main political blocs persists despite the narrowing of the programmatic differences between them. significant conflict has also been observed between the social partners and the breakdown of corporatism, with the social partners failing to develop a common understanding of the problem of unemployment.
79 in addition to conflicting views on labor market policy, low levels of trust among the social partners are also seen. 80 This situation makes it rather difficult to assume the cross-class compromise long associated with the swedish model of welfare, especially with the withdrawal from the coalition by employers, who in the face of globalization, contrary to the voc skills argument, increasingly challenged the social democratic welfare state of the swedish model. The crumbling cross-class compromise provided the political foundation for the successive decline of social solidarity in sweden. Yet while the ideological shift of social democracy suggests the possibility of a new broad coalition without labor, the sap's need to at least partly accommodate trade union views, in addition to severe political conflicts after the end of social democratic hegemony, the breakdown of corporatism, and the associated lack of trust among labor market elites, make it difficult to identify a new, meaningful political coalition at the heart of swedish labor politics that compares to the previously stable, cross-class coalition of the golden age. been used to illustrate employer interests in generous social protection. bismarckian social insurance legislation created a system of earningsrelated social protection geared toward core industrial workers, complemented with strong employment protection. To cope with social change, the social insurance state, prioritizing horizontal redistribution, expanded over time to include other groups rather than establish universal citizenship-based rights (as seen in the swedish case of vertical redistribution). 82 The institutionalization of the bismarckian welfare state is typically associated with the political rationale of integrating the working classes into the young German nation state.
83 although the impetus for the bismarckian welfare state can clearly be located in the political realm, the system of earnings-related social protection is thought to have met the criteria of functional feasibility as well by facilitating economic coordination and a production regime based upon a highly skilled workforce. This provided, as voc theory contends and as discussed above, an incentive structure for employers and employees to invest in skills, especially industry-specific skills, which formed the functional foundation of broad cross-class support in favor of the bismarckian welfare state, generous earnings-related unemployment protection, and strong employment protection. 84 The social partnership of employers and trade unions that underpin the bismarckian welfare state is widely considered a defining feature of the conservative corporatist welfare regime.
in the wake of the economic crisis of 1966-67, when Germany first experienced recession and increasing unemployment rates after its postwar economic miracle, the system of employment promotion was comprehensively modernized with the 1969 employment Promotion act, which displayed some similarity to the swedish approach to active labor market policy. This legislation pursued the objectives of full employment, productivity, and economic growth, and was focused on investing in human capital to cope with the consequences of structural change. improving the skills profile of the workforce by vocational training and retraining was considered decisive in the preventive approach of the employment Promotion act, and job creation programs were pursued to improve skills and assist structural change. The importance ascribed to a skilled workforce was also reflected in the protection of occupational status and the prescription to avoid substandard employment (employment not meeting the minimum standards set in collective agreements). 85 The legislation passed parliament unanimously and received wide support across the political spectrum, including principal support from employers. 86 but this early focus on human capital investment was short-lived. The economic crises of the 1970s and accelerating deindustrialization driven by technological progress, especially improvements in productivity, increased unemployment and policymakers were confronted with new challenges. To cope with rising unemployment figures, strategies to reduce the supply of labor featured prominently. The center right government of christian democratic chancellor helmut kohl (1982-98) promoted large-scale early retirement. at the same time, fiscal pressures translated into cutting measures that improved the skills of jobseekers and the employed. 87 With the welfare-without-work strategy of early retirement, the kohl government improved the politically sensitive unemployment figures, and the social partners benefited from early retirement. The measure enabled large firms to externalize the cost of laying off older employees when restructuring to increase productivity, which was imperative in Germany's environment of high nonwage labor costs. This productivity whip accelerated the process of deindustrialization, and these corporate strategies received broad support from trade unions in affected industries because their members benefited from publicly subsidized early retirement. consequently, employment losses in manufacturing and early retirement were among the main drivers of expenditure expansion in the postwar welfare state. 88 it is important to emphasize that the cross-class coalition of large employers and manufacturing unions, which had earlier provided critical support for the stabilization of the bismarckian welfare state, persisted and backed the welfare-without-work approach of early retirement. This is not to argue that there were no voices in government and business for a neoliberal turn. Thelen highlights that organized business was internally divided and was reluctant to call into question long-standing institutions without a clear alternative at hand.
89 it is also worth noting that the strong labor wing of the christian democratic party operated as a partisan veto player within the government.
90 apparently the interests of workers, typically associated with social democracy, were represented in the center right government; they had a powerful voice in the trade 85 unionists of the christian democrats. as noted above, this situation was quite different from that of labor in sweden during the rule there of the political right.
The political landscape changed in the aftermath of unification in 1990, which resulted in a massive increase in unemployment in east Germany. following the routine response of welfare without work to address the rise in unemployment, the kohl government engaged in large-scale early retirement and job-creation programs.
91 but the welfare-without-work approach was increasingly considered unfeasible because of its cost. as a result, the kohl government restructured labor market policy by putting a stronger emphasis on workfare measures and reducing the generosity of early retirement schemes to make them less attractive. by the late 1990s, legislation also formally gave up the objective of full employment. a shift in the political strategy of organized business appears crucial to the tougher stance taken by the last kohl government, and these events are similar to what is observed in the swedish case. starting in the mid-1990s, employers were increasingly openly hostile toward the German model of welfare. With support from the liberals, who wanted to sharpen their promarket profile within the government, employers pressed the government for a neoliberal turn and comprehensive welfare cuts. 92 employer documents show that although retrenchment in unemployment protection had not featured prominently on the agenda of employers in the first half of the 1990s, 93 a few years later a more skeptical approach was taken toward unemployment benefits and employment promotion, one in which benefits were considered to promote welfare dependency and measures of active labor market policy were viewed as failing to deliver the skills needed for labor market integration. employers called for reduced benefit generosity and shorter unemployment benefits. for the long term, they proposed the maximum benefit be reduced to 60 percent of the average wage, which would effectively turn unemployment insurance into a flat-rate benefit for many jobseekers, especially for skilled workers who, according to voc, should profit from unemployment protection. furthermore, they proposed that unemployment and social assistance be merged at the generosity level of the latter, complemented with better ways to combine the receipt of benefits and employment to make work pay. With respect to employment promotion, they demanded that a greater focus be put on immediate reintegration into the labor market 91 (concentrating on youth and long-term unemployment), suggesting wage subsidies and short training measures; they rejected job-creation schemes as costly and ineffective. 94 as in the swedish case, these proposed labor market reforms are at odds with the voc skills argument, according to which employers and workers have common interests to defend. instead, changed business preferences in Germany undermined the cross-class coalition underpinning the bismarckian welfare state.
as a result of resolute business mobilization for neoliberal policy, the employer wing of the christian democratic Party gained political influence and the labor wing saw its power dwindle and partisan veto disappear. importantly, business calls for welfare state restructuring were part of a broader debate (the Standortdebatte) on Germany as an industrial/ business location in the context of intensified competition in the global economy. in this globalization discourse, the reduction of nonwage labor costs was seen as central to improving the competitiveness of German businesses and to tackling the perceived cost crisis of the German welfare state. The argument is very similar to the concerns raised by swedish employers. critically, the globalization discourse was shared across the political spectrum, even though the social democrats initially continued to oppose labor market restructuring.
95 it is important to highlight the change in the social democrats' position because it indicates that the party started shifting ideologically in the 1990s in response to the perceived imperatives of globalization. With these developments and displaying considerable similarities to the experience of their swedish counterparts, the social democrats effectively accepted a shift in power toward business-a change with huge implications for future social democratic governments. in the last kohl government , organized labor tried to regain political influence with an initiative for a tripartite "alliance for jobs" between the government, business, and trade unions. but the alliance, which had no equivalent in sweden, quickly fell apart when the center right government continued to push its agenda for welfare state restructuring. 96 With employers' gradual withdrawal from this cross-class alliance, the political equilibrium for labor market policy experienced a critical destabilization, and the cross-class alliance for bismarckian unemployment protection continued to crumble under the social democratic leadership that replaced kohl. Thus, as in sweden, the social democrats in Germany changed their approach to social welfare. in 1998, a red-green alliance came to power without a master plan for welfare or labor market reform. inspired by the success of social concertation in the netherlands, chancellor Gerhard schröder invited the social partners for talks aimed at revitalizing the alliance for jobs in an effort to overcome the widely perceived reform gridlock. schröder, a social democrat, was confident that he would be more successful in social concertation than his conservative predecessor. but the red-green alliance for jobs did not prove to be particularly successful either. There was no consensus on how to solve the unemployment problem between the government, business, and organized labor, and the alliance was thus unable to develop a consensual agenda for labor market and welfare reform (a situation that also resembles the swedish case). employers and trade unions were not prepared to make any meaningful concessions, the chancellor did not show sufficient political leadership or authority to facilitate exchanges between the parties, and the parties (again similar to the swedish experience) had seen a sharp decline in trust. as a result, the labor market reform of the first red-green government was modest and focused on improving job placement. substantive investment in human capital through training programs was prevented by the Ministry of finance and modernizers in the social democratic parliamentary party. With support from organized labor, social democratic traditionalists vetoed any benefit cuts or other workfare measures-initiatives that had been pushed by the modernizers who, with support from the chancellor, sought to move the party ideologically toward the center. 97 Trade unions largely welcomed the reform though demanded more employment promotion for jobseekers, while employers took a more critical stance and called for a tougher sanction regime and labor market deregulation. 98 The labor market reform was widely perceived as not meeting the challenge of long-term unemployment, but a more comprehensive reform was considered politically unfeasible in the run-up to the 2002 general election.
in early 2002, the scene changed dramatically when a scandal involving manipulated placement statistics at the federal employment service provided an opening for comprehensive labor market reform. in response, schröder set up a group that came to be known as the hartz commission to develop reform proposals, and after its reelection in autumn 2002, the red-green government with social democratic modernizers in the driver's seat used the commission instrumentally for agenda-setting in labor market reform. although the hartz commission report did not include explicit proposals for curtailing benefit generosity (demanded by employers but vetoed by trade unions), 99 the ensuing hartz legislation-challenging power resources theory-required major retrenchment and workfare, measures that involved the merger of unemployment and social assistance at the benefit level of the latter and a reduction of unemployment benefit duration. The deregulation of employment protection for temporary workers and the promotion of atypical employment also reflected a significant change in labor market policy. 100 in the politics of the hartz legislation, the placement scandal and agenda-setting through the hartz commission crucially allowed the schröder government to largely exclude trade unions from labor market policy-making and to minimize the influence of social democratic traditionalists. both groups had previously vetoed reform proposals by social democratic modernizers and were seen as defenders of the status quo in labor market policy, a position that was heavily discredited by the failings of the employment service. Providing momentum for radical reform, the employment agency scandal allowed organized labor to be sidelined, which is apparent in the composition of the commission. of its fifteen members, only two were from trade unions whereas eight, including the commission's chair, were associated with business interests. This marginalization exceeds the experience of swedish trade unions, which also faced problems with the social democratic party moving toward the political center. The new environment made possible comprehensive workfare policies that had not been politically feasible in the first red-green government. 101 Wolfgang streeck contends that the hartz commission signaled the ultimate failure of tripartite social concertation, represented by the alliance for jobs, and heralded the end of the corporatist century.
102 importantly, the break with corporatist policy-making resulted in isolating trade unions but not neglecting employers. in fact, the hartz legislation shows significant overlap with business demands from the late 1990s, 103 and indeed, employers showed great contentment with the legislation, while trade unions expressed their sharpest opposition. Thus, while bismarckian unemployment protection rested upon a strong cross-class consensus for most of the twentieth century, a disintegration of this consensus has been observed beginning with the withdrawal of employers from it in the second half of the 1990s. organized business, in a broader globalization discourse, called for comprehensive labor market restructuring, which appears largely incompatible with the bias to stability in the voc approach. The departure from the previous cross-class compromise and the new political stance of German employers are reflected in the new social Market initiative, established in 2000 as a well-funded neoliberal think tank with the mission to influence economic and social policy-making. importantly, the origin of this think tank was an initiative of the metalworking industry's employers' association;
105 this industry, with its reliance on industry-specific skills, should have been one least interested in dismantling the German model and its social insurance system. 106 hence, the assumption of a stable cross-class alliance with its foundation in the manufacturing industry 107 and its interest in industry-specific skills formation has become more difficult to perceive in welfare politics. in this context, it is worth noting that employers are operating in an environment of globalization and that the German economy is experiencing accelerating deindustrialization. although much of the voc literature, despite pointing to labor market and welfare dualization, 108 emphasizes continuity in the German welfare/production regime, the voc argument of linkage between generous social protection and specific skills formation might also suggest that deindustrialization and the corresponding decline in specific skills have successively undermined the German system of earningsrelated unemployment protection.
109
To conclude, business mobilization for neoliberal reform and the globalization discourse had a huge effect on both christian and social democracy in Germany; within the social partnership, power resources shifted toward business. With the greater prominence of employer preferences in political parties and an observed decline in programmatic differences between parties (as in sweden), unions were successively marginalized in labor market policy-making, at first through the declining influence of the labor wing in the christian democratic party, and then through the traditionalists' and trade unions' loss of power in social democracy. Thus, the break with corporatist policy-making increasingly isolated organized labor while employer preferences gained weight across the political spectrum, indicating a grand coalition without labor.
labor market reforms in south korea: the decline of the developmental state korea is typically classified as a developmental welfare state, in which social policy is regarded as handmaiden to the economy and where a dominant state is at the heart of the economic modernization project. during the period of industrialization from the 1960s to the 1980s, the korean state steered economic coordination among capital and labor in pursuit of speedy catch-up with advanced economies. at the core of this state-led coordination was the developmental alliance, a coalition between the state and business established to nurture "national champions," large business conglomerates known as chaebols, in strategic industries that could compete in the global market. The project required long-term investments for which the state engineered a system of patient capital. Through direct and indirect control of the banking sector, the state ensured the supply of long-term, low-interest credit in addition to industrial subsidies. state control over finance is widely considered the most important aspect of the developmental state because it makes it very difficult for companies to ignore state expectations. 110 in contrast to its dominant role in coordinating economic development, the korean state performed a marginal role in social welfare provision, unlike the experiences in the cmes of sweden and Germany where the primary concern was for industry-specific skills formation. instead, the korean government imposed welfare provision on employers, who had to bear the costs of enterprise welfare 111 and high employment protection.
112 according to the voc argument, we would expect korean employers to accept these costs willingly, as generous company welfare provision and high employment protection are deemed to encourage workers to commit to firm-specific skills formation.
113 in fact, many employers, especially large ones, exceeded statutory requirements in enterprise welfare provision. The predominance of firm-specific skills is critical for understanding the much greater prominence of enterprise welfare in korea, as compared to Germany and sweden. in contrast to the european cmes, in korea public welfare provision was undesirable from an employer's point of view because it undermined rather than promoted firm-specific skills formation. To achieve an effective longterm employment system, the authoritarian state effectively enforced a no-layoff policy at large firms.
114 as a result, core workforces (male regular workers in large manufacturing enterprises) enjoyed de facto lifetime employment 115 in addition to extensive company welfare.
116
The characteristics of the korean developmental welfare state underscore the centrality of work and resemble the Japanese model of welfare through work. 117 The korean state also emphasized job creation through public work schemes and infrastructure investments rather than through social safety nets as a means to eradicate poverty.
118
The absence of unemployment protection and generally residual public welfare provision meant extremely low levels of decommodification. Yet the welfare-through-work model performed well during the period of industrialization due to high economic growth, and it allowed the booming manufacturing sector to absorb migrant workers from rural areas.
119 from the perspective of pra, the high level of commodification in the korean welfare state can be understood as an outcome of the exclusion of organized labor in policy-making. The labor movement was severely repressed-not only because repression was deemed necessary to achieve wage restraint and industrial peace for economic development, but also because labor was considered a potential opponent to the regime, as discussed above.
120 industrial unions were outlawed and enterprise unions were promoted because the former would have facilitated the mobilization of the working class as a political force and the latter limited union activities to company-level issues.
121 because unions were prohibited from participating in political activities, they were neither able nor inclined to engage in broader issues of public policy. 122 Thus, the politics of the korean developmental welfare state can be explained in terms of a state-business coalition that promoted a welfare-through-work 114 ringen et al. 2011, 51. model to facilitate firm-specific skills formation, while labor was excluded from social policy-making.
as the coordinating capacity of the state declined in the mid-1990s, the developmental welfare state and its state-business alliance experienced increasing pressure. The success of state-led industrialization had altered the power balance between the state and business. by the end of the 1980s, chaebols controlled large parts of the economy and democratization had given them louder voice. business demanded neoliberal reform with increased confidence, as the swedish and German employers had done, calling for an end to excessive state intervention in the financial and labor markets. Moreover, similar pressure for liberalization of the korean economy was being applied by the United states. after the end of the cold War, the United states became increasingly intolerant toward its substantial trade deficits with korea and the korean government's protection and control of the domestic market. Thus, the Us pressure on the government to relax its strong grip on the economy strengthened the position of employers. in this context, the conservative government of kim Young-sam (1993-98) pursued a set of liberalization reforms. The infamous economic Planning board was abolished and the financial sector was liberalized, which gave firms entrance into the nonbank intermediaries sector and greater access to equity markets and foreign credit. at the same time, industrial subsidies had been almost phased out, largely due to mounting budget deficits.
123 once the state relinquished its control over corporate finance-the key tool of state-led coordination-business no longer depended on the state for its success. We observe below that business became outspoken about its unwillingness to bear the costs of high employment protection. as global competition became fiercer, employers, in parliamentary hearings and policy documents, articulated their strong preference for neoliberal labor market reform, arguing that high labor costs and rigid employment regulations were the source of the declining competitiveness of the korean economy. They threatened to hollow out the manufacturing industry by relocating production to developing countries, especially to china, unless reforms to increase the flexibility of the labor market-notably, the legalization of layoffs and temporary agency workwere implemented.
124 it was argued that increased global competition no longer allowed the retention of workers made redundant since the late 1980s by the automation of production lines. The development appears similar to the productivity whip at German workplaces. employers also began to show increasing unwillingness to shoulder the burden of company welfare provision.
125 employers' push for employment deregulation and retrenchment in enterprise welfare challenges the voc proposition that in cmes with a high reliance on firm-specific skills, employers would support high employment protection and company welfare to promote the formation of such skills. instead, we find employers using a rhetoric of cost pressures and globalization that resembles the arguments of their German and swedish counterparts.
The state's loss of grip on labor became obvious during the kim Young-sam government. having played a pivotal role in democratization, the power of the labor movement had increased. as the government was still reluctant to fully involve organized labor in policy-making, unions used their newly obtained clout to achieve particularistic interests, often employing militant tactics. Wage increases, especially among large firms, were far higher than the government's wage guidelines. but rising labor costs contributed to a decline in competitiveness among korean industries, as well as to the widening wage gap between workers of large and small enterprises, which amplified labor market dualism. 126 aware of the rising power of organized labor, the government attempted to trade some limited unemployment protection for desired labor market deregulation to appease unions for the loss of job security that deregulation would cause. business reluctantly accepted the government's proposal as the price for realizing its policy priority of labor market liberalization.
127 but unemployment protection was low on organized labor's agenda at this early stage of democratic transition, and employment deregulation in exchange for meager unemployment protection was simply unacceptable to it. When the incumbent conservative party passed legislation permitting layoffs in case of managerial needs, the two rival national labor federations (the federation of korean Trade Unions and the korean confederation of Trade Unions) came together to launch a general strike, which demonstrated the new power of organized labor in democratic korea. 128 The government, unprecedentedly, was forced to postpone the implementation of the labor market reform bill for two years, opening up the possibility that the bill could be scrapped by a new government.
The departure from the welfare-through-work model, initiated by the conservative kim Young-sam government, was unexpectedly consolidated during the center-left kim dae-jung government (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
The east asian financial crisis of 1997-98, when unemployment in korea rose from 2.5 to 8.7 percent and gdp dropped by a massive 5.8 percent, revealed the increased vulnerability of korea in the global economy, especially due to largely unregulated flows in global capital and the substantial export orientation of korean manufacturing companies and their ability to relocate production. 129 Unlike patient capital engineered by the state, foreign capital was quick to exit korean firms, resulting in an unparalleled scale of bankruptcies, including chaebols, across the economy. critically, the growing importance of short-term profit maximization made the pursuit of full employment increasingly untenable. for firms to better respond to changing business cycles and external environments and in addition remain attractive for foreign capital, greater labor market flexibility was deemed crucial across the political spectrum. The Us-dominated international Monetary fund also pushed for it. in the wake of the crisis, the new government implemented the postponed labor market liberalization, which translated into a considerable increase in atypical employment (approximately 35 percent of all wage earners according to conservative estimates), and thus reinforced labor market dualism and greatly contributed to rising income inequality.
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The erosion of employment protection, a key pillar of the welfarethrough-work model, was accompanied by growth in social welfare provision. in the young korean welfare state, unemployment protection experienced considerable expansion with the universalization of the unemployment benefit, though it was still modest by international standards. Unemployment protection was extended initially to all full-time workers and later to some atypical workers.
131 furthermore, noncontributory unemployment protection policies underwent a significant expansion. The public assistance scheme was extended to the ablebodied for the first time, providing a functional equivalent of unemployment assistance, and public work schemes were used for those not covered by unemployment insurance.
132 essentially, the reforms were geared toward protecting labor market outsiders (employees of small firms and atypical workers) against the risk of unemployment. it should be noted that the expansion of unemployment protection, especially noncontributory programs, was increasingly financed by general taxes; the state took on a new role in welfare provision, moving away from its previous role as a regulator of welfare.
133 in summary, labor market reform during the kim dae-jung government considerably deteriorated the welfare-through-work model by expanding social protection for the unemployed and by undermining job protection for the shrinking number of insiders.
behind this korean version of flexicurity was the transformation of korean welfare politics. The economic crisis created a critical juncture that allowed the rise of a reform alliance of the left, which could be interpreted in terms of power resources theory. on the one hand, the crisis facilitated a change of government. The electorate wanted to punish the conservatives for their mismanagement of the economy, and the center left party won the presidency for the first time. on the other hand, the crisis played a key role in the critical policy U-turn of the center left party and unions in their acceptance of labor market deregulation. 134 Witnessing a series of bankruptcies of chaebols, long regarded as safe havens of employment, leaders of both labor federations saw that it was impossible to defend high employment protection. This turn of the political left toward accepting labor market liberalization together with the push by conservatives and business since the mid-1990s for labor market deregulation, indicates that the previous full employment model of welfare through work was effectively abandoned by both the political left and right.
but it should be noted that despite accepting retrenchment in the form of labor market deregulation, the left's reform coalition seized the opportunity to champion the welfare state. This alliance especially promoted an expansion of social protection toward labor market outsiders-employees of small firms, atypical workers, and the unemployedflying in the face of insider/outsider theory. Within the alliance, the two labor federations took a leading role in advocating the welfare rights of labor market outsiders and the center left party followed the unions' advocacy. 135 Why, contrary to the common perception that korean labor movements did not promote the welfare state, did unions shift their priority from particularistic interests largely benefiting insiders to the expansion of the welfare state mostly benefitting outsiders? once again, the crisis played a key role. it opened organized labor's eyes to the limits of enterprise unionism in the era of globalization. in the wake of the crisis, employers were quick to abandon their commitment to lifetime employment and generous company welfare benefits. The state had no power over employers to reinforce the welfare-through-work system. for the labor movement, pursuing the existing strategy of material gains at the company level increasingly became a dead end. backlash from this old strategy included popular criticism of self-serving behavior benefiting only labor market insiders and neglecting an everincreasing number of outsiders. hence, public support for unions had been on a steep decline and caused an existential crisis in the labor movement.
136 as a result, labor federations endeavored to reinvent the labor movement and reestablish it as a legitimate political force. in this context, advocating the rights of outsiders was deemed imperative. but the new strategy created a schism between labor federations and company unions. While most enterprise unions, especially those of large workplaces, were still occupied by protecting the prerogative of insiders, the federations placed a greater emphasis on the expansion of the welfare state to outsiders. 137 against this background, labor federations advocated the extension of unemployment insurance to employees of small enterprises as well as to part-time and daily workers. Moreover, the radical federation, the korean confederation of Trade Unions, was at the center of a civil society campaign for public assistance reform to extend coverage to the unemployed. While much of the literature highlights the role of civil society, we emphasize the contribution of organized labor as well as the importance of the center left party in overcoming resistance from the longstanding alliance of bureaucrats and employers to the reform of unemployment insurance and public assistance. critically, the party successfully portrayed the old alliance as being responsible for the crisis due to its collusive relationship: bureaucrats had overlooked the reckless corporate expansion and high leveraging that put the korean economy into unprecedented turmoil and unemployment. This strategy of political scapegoating created widespread antipathy toward the alliance and chaebols, and their political influence was greatly diminished. Unlike the experiences in sweden and Germany, in korea employers were perceived as part of the problem and the crisis was associated with crony capitalism. capitalizing on the huge swing in public opinion against the old alliance, the center left president kim dae-jung was able to break through some considerable opposition among bureaucrats 138 could afford to ignore employers' strong opposition to the expansion of social protection. Thus, while globalization strengthened the political power of employers in sweden and Germany, making their positions acceptable across the political spectrum, korean business was severely discredited by the east asian financial crisis, creating an opportunity for the improvement of unemployment protection that was used skillfully by the korean political left. To summarize, paradoxically, the rise of the political left in korea consolidated the conservative reform agenda of labor market deregulation. The left accepted the reality of intensifying economic competition created by globalization and put in place a substantially expanded social safety net, which would not have happened under the conservative leadership. This finding indicates that in korea, the old politics of the developmental welfare state has been replaced by a new politics in which political parties, especially the political left in an alliance with trade unions, have started to make a difference, and provides some support for power resources theory in the expansion of unemployment protection. The korean case also suggests that globalization is not an objective force with an inevitable race to the bottom, and highlights the continued importance of politics. as in the cases of sweden and Germany, globalization strengthened the position of korean employers, that is, their threat to hollow-out manufacturing industries, but this strategy found its limits when the east asian financial crisis discredited employers. although business achieved its policy objective of labor market deregulation, it could not prevent improvement of unemployment protection. This and earlier reform episodes show that with the state's loss of control over business, korean employers present social policy preferences that are very similar to their counterparts in liberal market economies (lmes), suggesting korean employers' declining interest in investing in firm-specific skills. and indeed, from a voc point of view, it is with considerable surprise that we see the most comprehensive deregulation of the labor market-affecting both insiders and outsidersin the least likely case of korea, with its tradition of firm-specific skills.
conclusions
The labor markets in all three coordinated market economies examined in this article have experienced far-reaching change since the 1990s, and have effectively abandoned the full employment objective of their postwar welfare settlements. sweden and Germany have seen comprehensive retrenchment in unemployment protection and a shift toward workfare. This development, intensifying the recommodification of labor, undermines social solidarity and challenges the egalitarianism that was widely associated with coordinated welfare capitalism. in korea, we observed a departure from its welfare-through-work model, which in the past produced comparatively high levels of social cohesion in the absence of generous social welfare provision. all three countries have deregulated temporary employment, undermining the regular employment that long characterized their labor markets and welfare regimes. only regular workers in korea have seen a decline in employment protection. labor market insiders in Germany and sweden have been spared labor market deregulation.
These empirical developments call into question the emphasis on stability that is typically associated with the institutionalist study of cmes, which have not only experienced a decline in social solidarity but also in coordination. sweden and Germany have experienced an erosion of the postwar compromise that allowed generous social policies and support for the unemployed. in the face of greater competitive pressures, increased employer opposition to social welfare provision challenged the cross-class alliance that brought stability for so long. a decline in partisan difference, especially with social democracy ideologically moving toward the center and accepting retrenchment and workfare, put trade unions further on the defensive. The persistence of unemployment weakened trade unions and strengthened the bargaining position of employers. critically, in sweden social democracy appears to have lost its hegemonic status, and the center right is in a position to engage in retrenchment without electoral repercussion. as far as the German case is concerned, the argument of a decline of social partnership and coordination is particularly notable, as the German cme is still widely associated with high levels of coordination and cross-class support.
in korea, coordination relied on a strong state with growth-oriented bureaucrats dominating policy-making. economic liberalization and democratization challenged bureaucratic dominance and state-led coordination of the developmental welfare state. in an environment of increased global competitive pressure, business withdrew its support for the existing welfare-through-work system and showed increasingly liberal social policy preferences. breaking with the developmental alliance, employers did not hesitate to loudly voice their policy preferences. although employers' influence was important for the deregulation of employment protection, in the aftermath of the east asian financial crisis that influence lessened; korean business was discredited by reckless corporate behavior that was thought to have at least contributed to the crisis of the economy. at the same time, democratization ended the repression of organized labor, which developed into a champion of the welfare state for labor market insiders and outsiders. in addition, political parties became a significant agency in social policy-making. Unlike our observations in Germany and sweden, we still find some significant partisan differences in korea as far as unemployment protection is concerned. but despite considerable welfare state expansion, the decline in employment protection has made korea more liberal.
To conclude, our examination of sweden, Germany, and korea-three critical cases in the study of coordinated welfare capitalism-questions the assumption of relative stability that is commonly associated with the study of cmes, as well as the assertion that this stability is associated with the persistence of established political coalitions. We contend that across all three cases a collapse of old welfare state coalitions is the key political driver of labor market reform, with the withdrawal of employers from previous welfare settlements at the heart of this development. importantly, regardless of the institutional context (that is, social democratic, conservative corporatist, or developmental welfare), employers in all three countries increasingly behave like their lme counterparts with respect to public social welfare provision and employment protectionundermining the argument of cross-class coalitions in recent welfare reforms in cmes. While business responded to perceived pressure from globalization, partisan policy-makers also responded to perceived fiscal constraints. our findings thus very much challenge the voc argument of "limited movement" 139 in cmes in the face of globalization, which shifted power resources in favor of employers. despite considerable liberalization in coordinated welfare capitalism, we do not argue that we are simply converging to one model of capitalism, but rather that the observed decline of social solidarity and coordination in these countries suggests that all three are in a state of flux, which has not been fully acknowledged in the literature. our findings call for greater empirical scrutiny in the study of coordinated welfare capitalism, and for greater scrutiny in the comparison of cmes and lmes, so as to be in a better position to assess to what extent cmes and lmes might or might not be converging.
